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Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative R&D Incentives 
under Incomplete Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research 
in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under 
asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down 
compared to the case of symmetric information; hence RJV incentives of the firms are 
larger under asymmetric information. In either case, however, the larger is the size of the 
cost-reducing innovation the lower is the incentive for cooperative research. Finally in 
our model, incomplete information does not affect the consumers’ welfare, but the firms 
become worse off.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Technological progress and economic development go hand in hand. However, 
technological progress requires well-directed and well-coordinated R&D efforts and it 
involves huge investment and uncertainty in achieving success. Even when the R&D 
succeeds, there is no guarantee that the innovators will be able to recover the costs of 
R&D investment and efforts because of the possibility of imitation, spillovers and leaking 
out of knowledge. So providing a required amount of R&D incentives to the private 
investors is an important policy concern. To prevent or reduce the threat of imitation and 
leaking out of knowledge, a strong and enforceable patent protection may be called for – 
after all, patent protection makes imitation costly. As a way out of the problem of high 
R&D cost and uncertainty, policy makers encourage cooperative research, or in 
particular, research joint venture (RJV) in which the private investors share the R&D cost 
as well as the research outcome.
1
 Free riding problem is then also reduced.   
 
There is already an extensive literature on the choice of R&D organization. This literature 
discusses, in particular, the choice between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D. For 
instance, Marjit (1991) introduces uncertainty in R&D outcome. d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) and Suzumura (1992) discuss the choice under spillovers. Motta 
(1992) discusses the choice when products are vertically differentiated. Choi (1992, 
1993) studies cooperative R&D with moral hazard. Combs (1992) extends the model to 
the case when R&D cooperation means coordinating multiple research projects. Kabiraj 
and Mukherjee (2000) discuss the choice between cooperative and independent research 
in a three-firm framework. Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) introduce technology transfer 
with the choice of R&D organization. Silipo and Weiss (2005) consider the problem with 
both spillovers and uncertainty.
2
 Kabiraj (2006) studies the effect of imitation and patent 
protection in the context of innovations of two products and Kabiraj (2007) introduces 
synergy in R&D cooperation. On the other hand, Mukherjee and Ray (2009) consider the 
                                                           
1
 Following the National Cooperative Research Act 1984 a large number of cooperative ventures have been 
registered in the US. For instance, see Vonortas (1997) and DeCourcy (2005). 
2
 Also see Silipo (2008) for different forms of research cooperation and the related issues. 
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problem when the R&D outcome is certain but there is uncertainty in patent approvals. 
Such an uncertainty, it is shown, may induce the firms to do cooperative research. 
 
Surprisingly, no work so far has studied the effect of incomplete information in the 
choice between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D. Once we incorporate asymmetric 
information into the problem, the important questions that one may raise are the 
following: What is the incentive for non-cooperative R&D under incomplete 
information? Does it go up or down compared to the case of complete information? Does 
this alter the choice of R&D organization? How does this comparison depend on the size 
of the innovation and probability of success? What could be the possible welfare effect of 
incomplete information for the consumers and producers? And so on. 
 
Hence the purpose of the present paper is to extend the analysis of Marjit (1991) to the 
case of asymmetric information about the R&D outcome and then discuss the choice 
between cooperative and non-cooperative research. We assume that under non-
cooperative R&D each firm can observe only whether it itself is successful, and given the 
information about its own success or failure, it knows only the conditional probabilities 
of success or failure of its rival firm. The amount of cost reduction resulting from a 
successful R&D effort, however, is equal for both the firms. Thus, two possible unit costs 
are relevant for consideration, the cost when R&D succeeds and that when R&D fails. 
When the game reaches the stage of competition in the product market, each firm has 
private information about its own unit cost, and only a probabilistic notion about its rival 
firm’s unit cost. Thus, based on the levels of unit costs, each firm can have two discrete 
types: low, when R&D has been successful, and high, when R&D has failed.
3
 On the 
other hand, since under RJV firms conduct their research in a single lab and contribute to 
R&D efforts, all the partners have equal knowledge of and access to the R&D outcomes. 
                                                           
3
 In a different context though, Das Varma (2003) also treats cost reduction due to adoption of a process 
innovation as private information which constitutes types of firms which compete in an imperfectly 
competitive market and bid for obtaining the process innovation. He checks for the existence of a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of the auction which ensures an efficient allocation of the concerned process innovation. 
The difference in treatment with our paper is that we consider cost reduction due to own R&D efforts rather 
than an adoption of a process innovation through auction and we consider discrete types. Also in our 
context the amount of cost reduction is common knowledge, but when the game proceeds to the stage of 
 4
Then the firms are to decide ex ante whether they will cooperate in R&D and share R&D 
costs and outcomes. They will cooperate in research if and only if the ex-ante the 
expected payoff from cooperation is strictly larger.  
 
We derive the following results. First, the presence of incomplete information reduces the 
expected payoff of non-cooperative research; hence incentives for cooperative research 
vis-a-vis non-cooperative research are larger under incomplete information. Second, if 
the R&D cost is not large, cooperative research occurs if and only if the probability of 
success in R&D is either low or high. On the other hand, the larger the size of the 
innovation, the lower is the incentive for cooperative R&D. Note that asymmetric 
information has two opposing effects. It benefits the firm to the extent it holds private 
information. It hurts the firm because it does not exactly know the rival’s type. Finally, 
the existence of incomplete information hurts the firms, not the consumers; hence the 
overall welfare of the economy may fall.
4
 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model and discuss the 
problem. Section 3 derives welfare implications of incomplete information. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Model 
 
We consider an interaction of two symmetric firms both in R&D and production. Call 
them firm 1 and firm 2. In the first stage the firms conduct R&D and in the second stage 
they compete in the product market non-cooperatively. R&D, however, can be either 
cooperative or non-cooperative. In either case, the R&D outcome is stochastic. We 
assume that if an amount 0>R  is invested in R&D and the R&D is successful, the unit 
cost of production falls from the present unit cost 0>c  to ε−c . Here 0>ε  represents 
the amount of cost reduction due to the successful innovation. Let )1,0(∈α  be the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
product market competition, each firm is uncertain about the type of its contender, and thus each firm has 
private information about its actual unit cost.  
4
 See, in this context, Mukherjee and Ray (2007) which discusses the effects of process patents on 
innovation and welfare. 
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probability of success; therefore, failure occurs with probability )1( α− .5 Throughout the 
analysis we assume that the innovation is minor or non-drastic in the sense that even if 
only one firm succeeds in the innovation effort, it still cannot emerge as a monopolist. 
Hence product market competition is always a duopoly in our model. Further, 
cooperative research is in the form of research joint venture (RJV) by which the firms 
share the R&D costs as well as R&D outcomes, but under non-cooperative research each 
firm invests in its own lab.  
 
Under RJV, since both the firms conduct research jointly, they have symmetric 
information about the outcome of the research. But under non-cooperative research, the 
research outcome is perfectly observed by respective firms alone and not by their 
contenders. Hence, at the production stage, there is asymmetry of information about the 
R&D outcome. Each firm knows whether it is itself successful or not, but it knows only a 
prior probability distribution over the outcomes of the other firm’s research, and this 
probability distribution along with its domain is common knowledge. Hence, with non-
cooperative research, the firms in the product market will play a Bayesian game. 
Therefore the firms will have to decide ex ante whether they will cooperate in R&D or 
not. We assume that both the firms are risk neutral.  
 
We consider the following sequential move game. In the beginning (i.e., at the R&D 
stage) the firms decide whether they will go for cooperative or non-cooperative R&D 
based on their expected payoff estimation. Then at the production stage they will choose 
quantities simultaneously. If it is non-cooperative R&D in the first stage, then they play 
the Bayesian Nash game in the second stage, and if it is cooperative R&D in the first 
stage, it is simple Nash game in the second stage. In the following analysis we consider 
quantity competition in the product market with perfect substitute goods.  
 
Let the market demand for the products be given by  
c  };  ,0max{ 21 >−−= aqqap                                                                         (1) 
                                                           
5
 We discuss the case of continuous distribution of the R&D outcome in a different paper. 
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where p  is the price of the product and iq  is the supply of firm i . We now estimate the 
expected payoffs of the firms from the choice of each of cooperative and non-cooperative 
R&D. 
 
2.1 Benchmark Case: Complete Information 
 
This is borrowed from Marjit (1991). The expected payoff of each firm under non-
cooperative R&D is, 
     RccccccccNC −−+−+−−+−−=Π ),()1()],(),()[1(),( 22 παεπεπααεεπα     (2) 
and that under cooperative research, 
     )2/(),()1(),( RccccC −−+−−=Π παεεαπ                                                           (3) 
Then the firms will go for cooperative research if and only if NCC Π>Π , that is, 
    )1()],(),(),(),([)2/( ααπεεπεπεπ −−−−−−+−> ccccccccR                         (4) 
Given the demand function (1), if ic  and jc  be the unit costs of firms i  and j  
respectively, the payoff expression of firm i  is given by 
9
)2(
),(
2
ji
jii
cca
cc
+−
=π . 
Hence the inequality (4) can be reduced to obtain 
    )1(
9
4
)2/(
2
αα
ε
−>R                                                                                                 (5) 
Since the RHS of (5) is strictly concave in α  with a unique maximum at  2/1=α  and 
RHS is 0 at both 0=α  and 1=α , then if R  is not very large, the above inequality holds 
for both small and large α , that is, if the probability of success is either high or low, 
cooperative research is preferred over non-cooperative research. We can now see the 
effect of incomplete information on the choice of R&D organization. 
 
2.2 Incomplete information 
 
Non-cooperative R&D 
 
 7
At the end of the R&D stage each firm knows whether it is successful in R&D or not 
(failure), but the other firm does not know, that is, each firm knows whether it has high or 
low unit cost of production, but its rival knows only the probability distribution; hence 
there is asymmetric information. We need to find out the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in 
quantities. Here each player is of two types, viz., successful (S) or failed (F), hence the 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy of player i  is ),( Fi
S
ii qqq = . Since the players are 
otherwise symmetric, the symmetric strategy choice will be S
SS qqq == 21  and 
F
FF qqq == 21  where (see Appendix 1) 
 
6
])(2[
6
])3()(2[
αε
εα
−−
=
−+−
=
ca
q
ca
q
F
S
                                                                                 (6) 
The corresponding payoff of each player in cases of success and failure are respectively, 
2
S
S q=π  and 2F
F q=π . Now under non-cooperative research when a firm invests 0>R , 
it gets a gross payoff of Sπ with probability α  and Fπ with probability )1( α− . Hence 
ex ante the expected payoff of a firm from non-cooperative research is 
 RFSNC −−+=Π πααπ )1(
~
                                                                            (7) 
On substitution, the expression can be reduced to obtain, 
R
cacaNC −
−
+
−
+
−
=Π
36
)59(
9
)(2
9
)(~
22 ααεαε
                                             (8) 
 
2.3 Cooperative R&D 
 
Here each firm invests )2/(R  in the RJV and whether the RJV succeeds or fails, the 
firms are always symmetric with respect to R&D outcome. Since success occurs with 
probability α  and failure with probability )1( α− , ex ante the expected payoff of each 
firm from R&D cooperation is, 
)2/(])(2[
99
)(~
2
Rca
caCC −+−+
−
=Π=Π ε
αε
                                            (9)                                                               
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Cooperative vs Non-cooperative R&D 
 
We are now in a position to state the results in terms of the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: Incomplete information about the R&D outcome reduces the expected 
payoff under non-cooperative R&D. Cooperative R&D incentives vis-à-vis non-
cooperative R&D incentives are, therefore, larger under incomplete information. 
 
Proof: The expected payoff from non-cooperative R&D under complete information is 
given by Eqn. (2) which can be reduced to get (see Appendix 2) 
    R
cacaNC −
−
+
−
+
−
=Π
9
)45(
9
)(2
9
)( 22 ααεαε
                                           (10) 
Then we can easily check that 
NCNC Π<Π
~
.  
Finally, we have 
    
NCCNCC Π−Π>Π−Π
~~
 
therefore, cooperative R&D incentives vis-à-vis non-cooperative R&D incentives are 
larger under incomplete information.                                                                                 ■ 
 
Note that the expected payoff under cooperative R&D remains unaffected with the 
introduction of asymmetry of information.  
 
Proposition 2: If R is not very large, then cooperative R&D is preferred to non-
cooperative R&D if the probability of success is either low or high. Non-cooperative 
R&D is preferred if the probability of success is of the intermediate level. 
 
Proof: The result holds because NCC Π>Π
~~
 if and only if, 
)1(
36
5
)2/(
2
αα
ε
−>R                                                                               (11) 
and the RHS of (11) is inverted U-shaped over )1,0(∈α .                                               ■ 
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Note that inequality (11) is quite similar to inequality (5). Hence the result underlying 
Proposition 3 holds irrespective of whether information is symmetric or asymmetric. If 
R is large enough, cooperative R&D is always preferred. 
 
Now to see the effect of asymmetry of information on the choice of R&D organization, 
we compare inequalities (5) and (11). The RHS of each of (5) and (11) is strictly concave 
over )1,0(∈α  with a unique maximum at  2/1=α , but the RHS of (5) is larger than the 
RHS of (11) )1,0(∈∀α .  
 
Thus incomplete information enhances the scope for cooperative research. This result 
follows from the fact that asymmetric information extends the probability interval for 
which the expected payoff under cooperative research is larger. In that sense also 
incomplete information increases incentives for cooperative research. In Figure 1, 
condition (5) is satisfied for all U )1,(),0( ααα ∈ , and condition (11) holds for 
U )1,(),0( ααα ∈ ; αααα <<< . Thus for U ),(),( ααααα ∈ , cooperative R&D 
occurs under incomplete information but not under complete information. Since 
asymmetric information generates uncertainty for the players about the extent of 
efficiency of the rivals, they reduce risk by means of cooperating in R&D. Conditions (5) 
and (11) together suggest that the larger the size of the innovation, the lower is the 
incentive for cooperative research; however, incentives for cooperative research fall at a 
slower rate under incomplete information. 
 
3. Welfare Implication 
 
Given the analysis of the previous section, consider the following cases, depending on the 
values of α , i.e., the probability of success in reducing the unit cost by an amount ε . 
 
Case (1): U )1,(),0( ααα ∈  
Here under both complete and incomplete information the optimal choice of R&D 
organization is cooperative research. Hence the expected payoff of each firm under 
 10 
complete and incomplete information are equal (i.e., CC Π=Π
~
) and given by (9). The 
corresponding industry output in either situation is given by 
)],()1(),([2 ccqccq αεεα −+−− . Hence when the probability of success in R&D is too 
low or too high, incomplete information has no effect on consumer’s welfare and 
producers’ profits. 
 
Case (2): ),( ααα ∈  
In this case under both complete and incomplete information the firms will choose non-
cooperative R&D. Then the payoffs of each firm under complete and incomplete 
information are respectively given by (2) and (7) (or alternatively, by (10) and (8)). We 
have already shown in Proposition 1 that NCNC Π<Π
~
. Therefore incomplete 
information reduces each firm’s expected profit.  
 
Now to see the effect on consumers’ welfare, consider the (expected) industry output 
under these situations. The aggregate output under complete information is, 
       
]
33
c)-(a
2[         
)],()1()),(),()(1(),([2 22
αε
αεεααεεα
+=
−+−+−−+−−= ccqccqccqccqQ NC
   (21) 
and that under incomplete information 
       
]
33
c)-(a
2[         
])1())(1([2
~ 22
αε
αααα
+=
−++−+= FFSS
NC qqqqQ
                                                (22) 
Hence, NCNC QQ
~
= , that is, consumers’ welfare is not affected by incomplete 
information. 
 
Case (3): U ),(),( ααααα ∈  
This is the most interesting case in the sense that for these values of α  the firms will 
choose non-cooperative R&D under complete information but cooperative R&D under 
incomplete information, that is, incomplete information changes the choice of R&D 
organization. Then the expected payoffs of each firm under these regimes are given by  
 11 
NCΠ and CΠ
~
. These are given by the expressions (10) and (9), respectively. Since for 
these values of α  we have CNC Π>Π , i.e., )1(
9
4
)2/(
2
αα
ε
−<R , then comparing CΠ
~
 
and NCΠ  we have NCC Π<Π
~
, that is, incomplete information not only changes the 
choice of R&D organization but it also reduces each firm’s expected payoff. 
 
To see the effect on aggregate output, we have NCQ  given by equation (21), but CQ
~
 is 
given by 
]
33
c)-(a
2[  )],()1(),([2
~ αε
αεεα +=−+−−= ccqccqQC                          (23) 
Hence, CNC QQ
~
= , that is, again incomplete information has no effect on output. The 
welfare results are summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: Given the probability of success in R&D, as we move from complete 
information to incomplete information regime, 
(a) Consumers’ welfare remains unaffected; 
(b) The firms become strictly worse off except for very low or high probabilities of 
success; and 
(c) The overall welfare of the economy goes down except when the probability of success 
is either too small or too large.  
 
Note that in Mukherjee and Ray (2009), uncertainty in patent approvals may induce 
cooperative research, and compared to non-cooperative R&D regime, under cooperative 
research both consumers and producers strictly gain. On the contrary, in our paper 
incomplete information may also induce cooperative research (Case (3) above), but under 
this situation firms are strictly worse off although the consumers’ welfare remains 
unchanged. Hence incomplete information that induces cooperative research may lead to 
a lower level of social welfare.
6
 
 
                                                           
6
 In a different context, with asymmetric R&D costs, Mukherjee and Ray (2014) have shown that entry 
reduces the profits of the incumbents and hence it can reduce welfare. 
 12 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have extended the model of Marjit (1991) to the case of asymmetric 
information about the R&D outcome in the context of the choice of R&D organization. 
We have derived two key results. First, if the firms do not know each other’s costs post 
R&D, then they have an added incentive to cooperate and enter into an RJV agreement. 
Second, the firms may become worse off under this scenario while consumers may not 
get better off. As a result, total social welfare, consisting of both consumers’ and 
producers’ surplus may fall. This leads to a policy dilemma in the context of the choice of 
R&D organization. While policies are directed against product market cooperation, R&D 
cooperation is generally encouraged. But, following our results, if the firms perceive 
asymmetric information at the stage of final goods production with respect to the R&D 
outcomes of the rival, cooperative research may be welfare reducing.      
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
Let ejq  be the expected output of firm j  as perceived by firm i . If at the end of R&D 
stage firm i  comes up with unit cost ic , its problem is : ii
e
ji
q
qcqqa
i
][max −−− . This 
leads to its reaction function, 
2
)(
)(
e
ji
ii
qca
cq
−−
= . Then 
2
))1()(((
)(
ccqa
qcqE
e
je
iii
ci
αεα −+−−−
== .  Under symmetry assumption 
ee
j
e
i qqq == , hence 
3
αε+−
=
ca
q e . This gives  
])3()(2[
6
1
]
3
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)([
2
1
)( εα
αε
εε −+−=
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S
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6
1
)( αε−−== cacqq i
F
i . 
 
Appendix 2 
Under quantity competition, 
9
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2
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jii
cca
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+−
=π . Hence,  
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